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               Abstract  
 
The somewhat neglected area of policy analysis, and more specifically cross 
sectional studies of implementation, might not be seen as the most interesting areas 
of research. Especially if examined though a power perspective viewed through the 
eyes of a professional front-line bureaucrat. 
 
If instead presented as a case study exploring physician’s perceived roles in the 
implementation of a health care policy reaching nearly all victims of cancer in a state 
with 30 million people. More explicitly, in a subsidizing pharmaceutical cancer 
scheme for the uninsured population in Punjab, India. While describing the daunting 
effects that the physicians might have on the equity and outcome of the scheme not 
raise more interest? 
 
This study might be defined as in the latter or/and the first. By using concepts 
from theories of profession, front-line bureaucracy and power, and by conducting 
interviews with physicians at 6 hospitals the study thoroughly aims to explore and 
explain the physician’s ability to change or alter the outcome of this health care 
policy through a power perspective.  
 
The study finds that the examined physicians exert positive power on the cancer 
treatment program while feeling relatively disempowered due to lack of guidelines 
and resources. No evidence for exerted negative power was found in the study. 
 
Key Concepts: Positive Power, Negative Power, Autonomy, Discretion, 
Professionalism, Subsidized cancer treatment, Public Health in India, Disempowered 
physicians   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This section highlights the subject, presents the problem and declares the purpose & 
contribution. The research questions and earlier research will also be presented here.  
 
1.1 Background 
The state of Punjab in India started a state cancer program in 2010. The program include 
four major parts; health education, controlling and decreasing environmental toxins and 
pesticides, diagnosis of cancer and free cancer treatment for the uninsured. The part of the 
program which gives free cancer treatment was started in 2013 and is called Mukh Mantri 
Punjab Cancer Rahat Kosh Scheme (MMPCRKS) (Department of health and family 
welfare, Government of Punjab, Cancer control program).  
  
The government states on the official website that; “Under this scheme rupees 50.00 crores 
has been made available by Govt. of Punjab, for treatment of all cancer patients except 
Govt. employees and those having health insurance cover. An amount of upto rupees 1.50 
lakhs is made available for treatment of every cancer patient. Till date, sanctions worth 
about rupees 53.55 crores have been accorded to hospitals for treatment of 4987 Cancer 
patients.”  (Department of health and family welfare, Government of Punjab, Cancer 
control program). 
 
This means MMPCRKS will pay for the cancer treatment, curative and non-curative, for 
the individual patient up to the amount of 1,5 lakh INR, or 150 000 indian rupees (as per 
may 2014 is corresponding to roughly 16820 SEK (valuta.se)). The cost for initial 
diagnosis will not be paid through this scheme, but there are other schemes in Punjab 
which heavily subsidizes the cost for the initial diagnosis of cancer. As of 2014 there are 
118 cancer treatment medicines under a special rate contract. Only these medicines will be 
subsidized through Mukh Mantri Punjab Cancer Rahaat Kosh Scheme (Department of 
health and family welfare, Government of Punjab, 118 cancer treatment). 
 
Only residents of Punjab have the right to take part of the MMPCRKS. The treatment 
under MMPCRKS can only be given by physicians on one of the 16 empanelled hospital. 
These are: 
 
 AIIMS in New Delhi  
 PGI, Government Medical College, Grecian Superspeciality Hospital, Indus 
Superpeciality Hospital and Max Healthcare in Chandigarh and Ajitgarh 
 Oswal Hospital, CMC and Dayanand Medical College in Ludhiana 
 Acharya Tulsi Dass Hospital in Bikaner 
 Max Hospital in Bathinda 
 Patel Hospital Jalandhar 
 Gurur Gobind Singh Medical College in Faridkot 
 Government Medical College and Sri Guru Ram Das Institute of Medical Science 
and Research in Amritsar 
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 Government Medical College in Patiala 
 (Department of health and family welfare, Government of Punjab, Cancer control 
program). 
 
To recieve the financial aid under MMPCRKS the patient needs to fill out a certain form 
and go through a kind of needs assessment. Both the local civil surgeon and the treating 
physician need to attest the form in order for the patient to get the funds, which is given 
from a board within the Department of Health and family welfare in Punjab (Department of 
health and family welfare, Government of Punjab, Cancer control program). These 
procedures can be seen in figure 1. 
 
         1.2 Overview of the situation in India 
Public health expenditures in India vary greatly across different states, but there is a clear 
trend. The overall costs of public health in India has decreased over the last ten years, at the 
same time has the public expenditures on medicine increased its share of the total public 
health costs. This has to do with medicine getting increasingly expensive. In India there is 
also a geographic difference in the percentage of the expenditure on medicines as a part of 
total public health expenditures. States in the southern part of the country spend 10-15 % of 
the public health budget on drugs whereas states in the northern part of the country, such as 
Punjab, spend 2-5 % of the public health budget on medicines (Kountey, 2011). 
  
 The current situation in India is severe; around 30% of the population in rural parts of 
India does not seek medical help because of financial reasons and for those who seek 
medical help, around 20 % don’t take any pharmacologic treatment for their diseases due to 
financial reasons (TNN. National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority told to fix prices of 33 
anti-cancer drugs, 2013). Furthermore, the cost of medicine in India has risen much in later 
years and out-of-pocket payments for vital medicines is one of the major reasons for 
household debts as well a leading contributing factor for causing poverty in the country 
(Chan, WHO, 2013) 
  
In 2013, the state of Punjab launched a wide cancer aid program which is based upon the 
tradition and guidelines of the national cancer control program founded in 1984 by the 
Indian government. One of the initiatives within Punjab’s cancer program was the 
subsidized pharmaceutical program for cancer patients in Punjab is the Mukh Mantri 
Punjab Cancer Rahat Kosh Scheme (MMPCRKS). The normative basis which lies as the 
foundation for MMPCRKS falls in line with UN-resolution 17/14 which was recently 
signed by the republic of India, where the country has agreed to facilitate aid to all its 
citizens by the; 
  
   “Right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health in the context of 
development and access to medicines” 
(United Nations, 2013) 
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 The new interest for the founded national cancer program, which aims to both control the 
spread of cancer and help the affected, comes concurrent to alarming reports on the 
growing number of cancer patients being discovered each year. A report states that due to 
development in social welfare in India and other factors including, urbanization, increased 
mean-age in the population and changing living habits the number of cancer patients is 
thought to continue rising over the next decade; preliminary reports show that the number 
is going to be reaching over 1 million new cases by the year 2020 (Department of health 
and family welfare, Government of Punjab, Cancer control program). 
 
At the same time, the medical costs for cancer medicine has increased, 2004-05 it was 
calculated that around 19 million people where forced in to poverty in India, due to out-of-
pocket expenses related to medical care (Department of health and family welfare, 
Government of Punjab, Cancer control program). 
 
 The inequalities of the Indian healthcare are persistent. As an example, hospital care and 
distribution of essential medication is often determined by in which state the individual 
lives and even within a state there is asymmetrical distribution of health care between the 
countryside and cities. Moreover the asymmetrical welfare is not only a product of 
geographical and economical differences between the different states, but is also a 
consequence of other inequalities like; caste, class (Baru et al 2010) and gender (Dasgupta 
1987) which persist within India. 
 
1.3 Physicians as professionals with power to affect the implementation 
Physician represented in the public healthcare system act as professional front-line 
bureaucrats and usually represents the implemented political activities in the area (Lipsky 
1980). In so far as the medical profession provides for autonomy and discretion from its 
superiors, there’s also room to change the outcome of the policy. It is with the unique 
knowledge and position within the healthcare system that physicians might truly become 
important players in the outcome of medical policy decisions. They are both experts in 
relation to their political superiors and decisions makers for their patients. There are rules 
that govern physicians in their choice of treatments and medications, among other things 
because the tangible assets are limited. The physicians can however, control their 
diagnoses so that they fall outside or inside the financial frames. It is difficult for someone 
who does not have postgraduate medical degree to question the judgments made in 
individual cases, so there is a space for physicians to interpret the ruling regulations and 
also to some degree control resources, costs and expenditures. By this causal link the 
physicians can be seen to have a position of power within the Indian healthcare system. But 
the questions then arise, to what extent do the physician perceive their power and are they 
able to use it effectively enough to change the outcome of the concerned policy.   
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1.4 Problem 
How the physicians perceive their ability to use their professional power to influence the 
outcome of the state policy dealing with cancer treatment among the population is a 
problem for investigation. On a state level, the physician’s main goal is to implement the 
healthcare which is set by political goals and therefore the physicians work is ought to be 
strongly affected by standardizations and regulations (Currie, 2012). The power to 
effectively alter the outcome of the political goals seems to derive from certain 
mechanisms which are to be found within the organizational level. In the organization; the 
physician, both as a professional and as a front-line bureaucrat has a central position of 
power. Towards both managers and the population (Lipsky, 1980) (see also Lehmann & 
Gilson, 2013, pp. 356-359). 
  
 On an individual level, the physicians’ day-to-day contact with the population reflects in 
their professional role as well as their role as front-line bureaucrats, within the public 
healthcare system. This can in certain instances, for example where corruption, selectivism 
and noncooperativism are prominent, reflect badly on both the state and the profession, 
explicitly hurting the equity in the healthcare system (Sheikh & Porter, 2011, p 84).  
 
But to what extent do the physicians truly exert their power over the implementation within 
the healthcare system and do they have the ability to divert or alter the policies which 
regulate their work? 
  
Sheikh & Porter claim in their article “Disempowered doctors? A relational view of public 
health policy implementation in urban India” that physicians in India’s public healthcare 
system mainly can hinder policies from being implemented while they have a weak 
position in regard to their ability to alter, change or initiate new policies. In the case of the 
MMPCRKS, the physicians might show resistance to the implementation, by the use of 
negative power, or actively, by the use positive power changes or improves the 
implementation accordingly. 
  
1.5 Purpose 
The study primarily aims to describe and explain physicians’ ability to change the outcome 
of a state public health policy through a power perspective.  
 
 1.5.1 Contribution 
Our contribution with this study will thus be an increased knowledge in the availability for 
the physicians, in the mantle of professional street-level bureaucrats to affect the outcome 
of policies within the MMPCRKS. Theories and conclusions made should also be 
applicable on other similar programs within India as theories are taken from both universal, 
international and national levels. The thesis also highlights the important power, of both 
positive and negative kind, which this profession possesses in the organization and by 
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exerting power these actors influences the equality in the healthcare and the policies goal 
attainment. 
  
1.5.2 Significance of the study 
Even as the study doesn’t implicitly aim to investigate the misusage of power within the 
system, earlier research suggests that misuse and corruption is prominent within the public 
administration in India’s public health sector (Sheikh & Porter, 2011). It’s therefore of 
importance to examine the role of the physician, as a prominent and powerful actor of the 
implementation. 
  
1.6 Research questions 
* What do the physicians think about the new state policy dealing with the cancer program 
for the uninsured population in Punjab? 
  
* How do the physicians, as frontline bureaucrats, use their professional power when 
implementing the cancer program to influence the outcome of set policies? 
  
* Are the physicians exercising positive or negative power to change the outcome of policy 
today or do they stand disempowered? 
  
1.7 Previous research 
Municio (1982) describes in Implementationsforskning. En litteraturöversikt, the field of 
implementation research and points to the implementation of policy as the most important 
to the outcome of policies. Within the implementation research there are further 
subdivisions, mainly between the so-called field implementation and the guideline writing. 
Wherein as guideline writing is about making the regulations and sub-goals on lower levels 
of the organization, field implementation is about transforming the policy into practical 
work. Ex ante and ex post are two ways to examine the latter, where ex ante is an 
implementation analysis that decision makers do when they faced with the choice of 
different policy. Ex post studies however examines the already made decisions and how 
they are implemented. 
  
  In the article Organizational Models of Social Program Implementation, Elmore (1978) 
has elaborated four models used for ex post studies. One of the models - the bureaucratic 
process model, focuses on discretion and routines and their role within the organization 
from a bottom-up perspective. Implementation is here seen as a process where these 
mechanisms are being controlled. The organizations behavior is, according to the theory, 
dependent on the delegations within the organization and routines created to enhance ones 
position within the organization. The power is thus divided into small units that greatly 
influence their own responsibilities. The model also brings to light, the inherent inertia 
within the organization that reflects in the slippage between the policymakers thought 
reforms and the factual response and implications of the workers and their routines. 
Changing the daily routines is the hardest to accomplish according to the model and 
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Elmore implicitly recommend the usage of the street-level bureaucracy when examining 
implementation. 
  
 Winter (2000) raises the question on whether the street-level bureaucrat is the master or 
servant, a reflection in the context of power and thought to reflect discretion used by the 
bureaucrats and the ability to change policies that comes with it. Winter also concludes that 
the political control over front-line bureaucrats is limited and often focused on easily 
accessed numbers, such as, the total number of inspection conducted under a certain period 
of time. Organizational control is also difficult since, the more specialized the work are, the 
harder it is to exercise control over and the more discretion is needed. Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno (2003: 8) for example states that: “Street-level work is, ironically, rule saturated 
but not rule bound”. Winter (2001) also concludes that the extent of discretion offered the 
bureaucrats is restricted to the amount of resources available. When confronted with 
limited resources or time, the bureaucrats tend to cope by rationing services, rationalizing 
program goals and discriminate by selecting cooperative clients (see also Lipsky 1980). 
  
 The article Reforming the health sector in developing countries: the central role of policy 
analysis by Gill Walt and Lucy Gillson (1994) argue for a new model of looking at policy, 
they analyze their model against research done within the field. The argument of their 
paper is that health policy often neglects the actors involved in “the policy reform, the 
processes contingent on developing and implementing change and the context within 
which policy is developed” (Walt & Gilson, 1994, p.1), thus only focusing on the content 
of reform and policy itself. This according to the authors is key to understanding why 
desired outcomes of policy sometimes fail. The paper suggests a more extensive model, 
taking into account both context, content, process and actors (both as individuals and as 
members of groups) to further grasp the essence of the health- policy process. 
 
 Prottas (1978) highlights the difficulties in controlling every day behavior of low level 
bureaucrats and in the article The Power of Street-level Bureaucrats in Public Service 
Bureaucracies, Prottas aims to provide a theoretical explanation. The study builds on the 
concept of “boundary actor” and thus place the source of the street-level bureaucrats’ 
power in their unique role as policy implementer in a street-level environment. He then 
examines the bureaucrats’ role and ability to seek autonomy from management and how 
their power actualizes. The study finds that a lot of the reported autonomy comes from the 
bureaucrats’ control of important functions, vital to the bureaucracy. Also that the 
actualization of power is dependent on the expectations of the bureaucrats work and to the 
extent it can be governed, Prottas shows that this is problematic; as the policies are often 
loose and the work highly specialized. The management can thus have problems in 
defining exactly what and how the bureaucrats should work, which is increasingly difficult 
if the bureaucrats work is built on standards as of a profession.  
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Irene Ajuya Agyepong and Sam Adjei’s paper (2008) on Public social policy development 
and implementation: a case study of the Ghana National Health Insurance scheme 
highlights, among other things, the importance of further study into the field of 
implementation. They argue that politicians need to further develop their appreciation for 
“technical analysis to support decision making rather than an indiscriminate use of political 
approaches”. The argument is taken, in the context of political leaders desires, to use 
political approaches that may not reach the desired objectives of the policy. The study 
sheds a light on the situation in Ghana regarding the initiative to implement a national 
health insurance scheme and is based on a qualitative method which observes and explores 
the challenges brought up from the adherent policy reforms. The papers view on the issue 
is mainly taken from a political perspective and thus little regard is given to the 
bureaucrats, other than the stated observations, that policies are not always understood or 
in line with the organizational traditions or the individuals own interests and thus not 
implemented as originally intended.  
 
Cadwallader et.al. (2009) presents in their paper Frontline employee motivation to 
participate in service innovation implementation points to the situational level of 
motivation among the frontline employees. According to the paper, the relevance of 
participants understanding of the initiative and their autonomy in the work process are both 
of key importance in creating motivational participation in service innovation 
implementation. The paper also claims to have found an empirical relationship between 
task autonomy and motivation. It confirms a significant positive relationship between 
“employee role clarity and employee recommending behavior, which was partially 
mediated by situational motivation to participate in implementation”. Methodologically the 
paper makes use of quantitative research and earlier tried scales, such as Breaugh (1985) 
and others. The conclusion of the paper could point to the relative task autonomy of the 
physicians as a motivation to derive from certain policies, or rather implement positive 
power, exempli gratia, to go beyond the policies directives during in the implementation of 
policies. Ipso facto, altering the outcome of the policies. Wang and Clegg (2002) also 
points out that there is a greater chance that the physicians will be more willing to take 
responsibilities for their decisions if they can influence the outcome of their work. 
 
Another paper that tells of the significance of deeper research into the “much-neglected 
aspect of policy analysis” and contributes through a qualitative examination to the use of 
power in implementation, is Uta Lehmann and Lucy Gilson’s paper Actor interfaces and 
practices of power in a community health worker programme: a South African study of 
unintended policy outcomes takes into account the difficulties of policy implementation in 
the context of power practice. The article explores micro-practices and their culminate 
impact on the diversion and or reshaping of set policy goals. It also finds that, almost all 
the policy actors seems to be using some form of power as a means to “make the 
intervention ‘fit their understandings of local reality” (Lehmann & Gilson 2013 p. 358). In 
its conclusion, the paper states that the understanding of the local situations complexities 
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and the practices of power could possibly allow for better management strategies to be 
constructed in the future. It also concludes that “implementing actors with informal 
authority can exercise power in ways that assist implementation towards policy goals, 
whilst those with formal authority sometimes use their power to undermine the 
achievement of policy goals” (Lehmann & Gilson 2013 p. 359). 
Subsidies are one form of financial incentive which is made to encourage a certain type 
of behavior by offering financial means. Consumer-oriented subsidies are common in 
developing countries and the intention is to influence the population to certain positive 
behaviors. The intentions behind the subsidies are often based upon normative ideas about 
equality, for example that people should have basic rights like access to food, clean water 
and fundamental health care (Bril-Mascarenhas & Post, 2012 
 
 
1.8 Demarcations  
We want to make certain demarcations in this thesis in order to achieve the purpose and be 
able to make the indentations required to answer the research questions. The study will not 
take into account the relation between different professions in the Indian healthcare, nor 
delve into the theory behind the layout of healthcare policies. The main basis for most of 
the boundaries is made based on the fact that we examine the professionals in the central 
organization for implementation. This means that theories relating to the users of public 
healthcare programs or the policy makers and their ability to influence the implementation 
part of a healthcare policy will not be lifted up thoroughly. This is also motivated by the 
theory’s relevance to the research question, which is limited to the aspect concerning the 
physician’s power, as a frontline bureaucrat, and his ability to use it.  
 
Physicians have other responsibilities towards their patient than just implementing 
programs, but we won’t study these responsibilities, neither will we study the physicians 
power after the patient being treated under the program. This is because we want to 
examine their perceived ability to self exercise power within their organization and how 
this affects the outcome of policy, not what happens after the implementation phase. 
 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
This part concludes the study design, data-collection, ethical commitments, validity and 
operationalization of the concepts. 
 
2.1 Study Design 
This is a qualitative cross-sectional case study; Physicians own thoughts about their power 
to implement the MMPCRKS will be measured only at this time.  
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2.2 Study Population and Centrally Placed Sources 
The interviewees will be chosen by the permits off centrally placed sources and limited to 
physicians functioning within the program (Esaiason et Al. 2012, p 253). With the help of 
contact persons from the University of Panjab and the Department of health and family 
welfare in Punjab we were able to find and locate these centrally placed sources within the 
healthcare system. These centrally placed sources are to be found in both the private and 
the governmental hospitals which implement Mukh Mantri Punjab Cancer Rahaat Kosh 
Scheme. Namely the PGI (3) and GMC (1) in Chandigarh, Indus superspeciality Hospital 
(1) and Max Healthcare (1) in Ajitgarh and Oswal Hospital (1) and Dayanand Medical 
Hospital (1) in Ludhiana. The centrally placed sources consisted of 6 administrative 
physicians and 3 clinicians. 
2.3 Data collection 
 
  2.3.1 Conversational Interviews 
   To be able to examine physicians within the MMPCRK-scheme, it’s not enough to have 
relevant theories and concepts described in the theoretical framework. There has to be 
some consensus as to, how the empirical data will be collected and subordinated to its 
corresponding theory. Since the ambition is to understand the physicians own perception 
on the issue, interviews will be used as a mean of data collection (Esaiason et Al. 2012, p 
253).  As such, conversational interviews will be conducted on hospitals empanelled in the 
scheme.  
2.3.2 Attaining good quality 
The respondents own views on the situation create the starting point for our result and 
conclusion, as their thoughts are crucial to understanding the issue. They are crucially 
important since they are the focus and subjects of the study and hence holds key 
information to asserting their own role within the implementation of the program. It is 
through precision and a deeper insight into the investigated physicians' perception of the 
cancer program that this study derives its good quality.  
 
In a qualitative study like this, the method can not be designed after the same requirements 
as for a quantitative study, as these are different kinds of research methods that responds to 
different types of questions. Yet it is undeniable, that the descriptions made in a qualitative 
study should hold equally as high a precision as the required accuracy of the quantitative 
study. If the qualitative study have this standard then it also has a very high quality (Kvale, 
1997).  
 
2.5 Constructing the questions  
The character of the interviews issues for questions that directs responses to the topic but 
leaves the questions itself relatively open. The questions are based on the concept 
determined by the theoretical framework and is meant to answer the study's research 
questions. Supplementary questions can hence vary from different interview subject. Based 
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on the interviewees’ answers, the connection between these answers and the theoretical 
concepts develop and become available for analysis. This approach ensures the prerequisite 
to an in-depth examination of the physicians’ perception on their ability to influence the 
outcome of policy as well as examining how they can do so. 
  
The theories found in the theoretical framework of the thesis are based on specific 
ontologies, but the theories are all proven to be scientific through the usage of empirical 
epistemology. Based on the physicians' own social construction we try to analyze their 
responses by taking so little regard to our subjective ontology as possible. This is carried 
out with such an open approach as possible, since the interviewee's own description will be 
compared with the theories presented in the theoretical framework. 
2.6 Operationalizing the theories 
All the interview questions are connected to how the physicians perceive their own 
organizational environment. Question 5, 6 and 10 connects with the coercive dimension of 
the institutional power (Currie, 2012) which is exerted by the policy makers in order to 
control the physicians whereas question 5 and 10 also can provide answers which we can 
connect to the normative dimension of institutional power.  
 
Question 12 and 14 will provide answers connected with the medical profession. 
Furthermore will question 5, 9, 10, 13 and 22 give us answers which we can connect to the 
deprofessionalization of the medical profession. It is important to understand the 
organization and the direct environment of the physicians in order to determine their given 
latitude in regards to the implementation and question 15, 16, 17 and 20 will provide 
answers which connect to autonomy and discretion.  It’s also important to see the 
physicians in their dualistic role and understand their latitude in accordance to their 
individual perception, since this gives additional understanding to how the physicians coop 
with their situation and possibly changes set policies, the questions which directly connects 
with this is; 18,19, 22 and 23. Question 16 helps to mediate the physicians understanding 
of the state policies themselves. 
 
2.6.1 The interview questions  
1. What do you know about the MMPCRK-Scheme? 
2. What do you think about the program? 
3. In what way are you a part of the program? 
4. Is there, in your opinion, something that can be improved with the program? 
5. Who decides ultimately who has the right to the medicine? 
6. Have you received any incentives to be part of the program? 
7. Do you think knowledge and information reaches all those affected by the  program's 
scope? 
8. Is there available information about the program on the hospital? How are the patients 
informed about the program? 
9. Who would you estimate has the most power to change the program outcomes? 
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10. Who controls the work process? 
11. What do you think affects most if a patient gets medicine or not? 
12. What expectations do you think the government has on you? 
13. In which way does the program influence your work situation, can you give some 
examples, please? 
14. Have your work practices changed because of the program? 
15. How do the administration of cancer medicine within the program work in practice? 
16. What directives have you received from the authority about the implementation of the 
program? 
17. To whom are you reporting? 
18. How do you feel about the design of the program? 
19. How do you feel about the scope of the program? 
20. How are the program and the patient physician meetings surveilled? 
21. Is there a change of program implementation today? 
22. Is the program doable in regards to design and scope? 
23. Do you feel any personal controversities between what your job tells you to do and what 
you want to do in regards to the program?  
 
2.7 Ethics 
Ethical consideration is taken through all steps of the conducted research, it is to be given 
to the interviewees as well as to earlier research on the area. The interviewees are 
guaranteed anonymity, that interviews will only continue as long as they want that any 
patient names logged during the interviews will be censored. They are also given the 
opportunity to receive a short manuscript with their logged answers so that they know what 
data which has been collected, and thereby given a chance to give an opinion. After 
collecting our samples, the different interviews, we randomize the inherent order of the 
interviews so that the physicians and the hospitals in Chandigarh and Ludhiana are 
presented randomly in the attached transcription. This is being done so there is no clue 
about whom have given which answer. 
 
2.8 Processing the data 
 
2.8.1 Making transcription 
The transcriptions of the interviews will be verbatim, although minor hesitations, moans 
and other small sound will be overlooked due to their irrelevance. No special formatting is 
needed but we make use of different in font style so the material will be more easily 
legible. To analyze the material the study pinpoints quotes which are of importance due to 
the context which they are taken from. The quotes is then mapped together with concepts 
which is to be found in the theoretical framework of the thesis.  
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 2.8.2 Coding in the analysis section 
Our analysis is created on the basis of quotes made by the physicians which supports 
various concepts connected with the theories presented in our theoretical framework. In 
order to get a better overview over where to find these chosen quotes in the attached 
interview transcription we have created a coding. The first three symbols represent: 
Interview (I), interview object number (1-8) and main theory (A = Power, B = Frontline 
bureaucracy, C = Professionalism, Z = Opinion about MMPCRKS).  
 
As an example it might be written like this: I2A. This explains that the quote comes from 
interview object number 2 and that the quote is connected with the analysis of power.  
Another example is I7B. This mean that the quote is taken from interview object 7 and is 
connected with the analysis of frontline bureaucracy. 
 
Furthermore each quote is given the symbol of X and is then given a number 
chronologically, in accordance of appearance in each interview, and not in accordance to 
all interviews, therefore X1 (quote 1) is found amongst all interview objects.  
 
This is two examples of how a total quote-code may look: I2A X3 and I1B X4. 
 
2.9 Validity 
Internal validity is secured through an interview scheme that dictates a clear connection 
between our questions and the theories and concepts which lies as the foundation in 
reaching answers to our research questions. 
 
There are many different ways to measure power and it’s hard to produce results with 
perfect validity (Esaiasson et Al, 2012). How is construct validity reached when linked to 
the theories and concept brought up in our theoretical framework? By asking as open 
questions as possible and then connect the individual responses to the theories we have 
presented, we reach face validity. This occurs through a process where we in the analysis 
make use of reasoning and common sense to connect operationalization to theory (Ibid). 
What we want to measure, is as mentioned before, not the degree of power, but how and 
what kind of power the physicians’ perceive themselves to have and how they 
operationalize this perceived power to impact the outcome of Mukh Mantri Punjab Cancer 
Rahaat Kosh Scheme. Having face validity we decrease the risk for this study being non 
consequential.  
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This section includes the theoretical framework concerning front-line bureaucracy, power, 
professionalization and adherent concepts.  
 
3.1 Power  
  
3.1.1 What is power?  
Power can be seen as the ability to impact other people and Bertrand Russel (1938) 
identifies three different kinds of impact; physical impact, impact through incentives such 
as punishments and rewards as well as the impact over opinion. Power has always existed 
in human associations because there is, and always has been, a need for someone to 
control, make decisions and initiate actions in a society. Anyone who does this thus has 
organizational power. Power as seen through a sociological and organizational perspective 
often takes the form of two counter poles. Hegel’s dialectical approach to power with his 
work “Master and servants” describes the relation between the powerful and the powerless 
and their dependency on each other for their positions of power. The analysis of Hegel by 
Rus (1980) generates the idea that power cannot be completely autodetermined 
(determined by its own) since the servant is born for the master and the master is born for 
himself. The master can only be born for himself if the servant is born as a servant for the 
master and this creates the understanding that the power between people is never 
completely determined by one actor in a relationship but is instead generated by the 
structure of a relationship, this means that power always is partly heterodetermined, e.g. 
determined by someone else. Hegel’s dialectical approach of power and how one actor’s 
power is inherent from another actor’s powerlessness might seem extreme in modern times 
and fails to completely explain how the power relation between individuals with similar 
amount of power might be dependent on each other for their structure of power. 
Nevertheless it is possible to make use of Hegels theory because it explains the basics of 
interhuman power structure, namely the fact that power cannot exist by itself in one 
individual and thus the power is dependent upon another actor’s state of power.  
 
 In summary, it can therefore be said that the power in social relations and organizations is 
the ability to impact others to perform an activity by punishing or rewarding their behavior. 
Those who have power are in a position of dependence on those who do not have power, 
and vice versa, and only through collaboration the power structure is upheld. 
 
3.1.2 Juxtaposing positive and negative power. 
There is a grand difference between positive and negative power which is needed to be 
comprehended in order to understand the basis of the power which the physicians may or 
may not possess or exert in their implementation of the cancer program in accordance to 
MMPCRKS. Rus (1980) describes positive power as induction, the ability to initiate 
activities. On the contrary he describes negative power as resistance, the ability to stop 
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activities. While it in a philosophical way might seem like resistance and inhibition are 
antitheses the article highlights that the two concepts of power, in theory, are part of a 
sustainable dialectical process where induction and resistance are “two poles of an 
otherwise uniform, contradictory process” (Rus, 1980, p. 6) and that these powers affect 
the processes of each others. This explains the fact that the two kinds of power are not 
complete opposites. According to this dialectical approach to positive and negative power, 
a strong negative power can be turned into positive power. 
  
 Physicians in India hence can be seen to possess either or both of these two types of these 
organizational powers. If they possess negative power, they are able to hinder the 
implementation of a certain policy, in the case of possessing or exerting positive power, the 
physicians might influence the outcome of policy by actively altering the policy or 
changing their implementation. 
  
3.1.3 The implementation perspective on Power as seen in  
the public healthcare 
With regard to the aim of this study we focus on the physician’s power within the public 
health care system. Power in the public health care is difficult to measure since power is an 
abstract term, however in the article “How to start thinking about investigating power in 
the organizational settings of policy implementation“ (2008) by Erasmus and Gilson some 
concrete examples of how power can be exercised is highlighted; physicians can for 
example exercise power over colleagues by giving them “derogatory labels or identities” 
(ibid,p. 3), they can exercise power over patients by withholding information to the patient 
directly or to other health instances. The physicians may also exert power over the policy 
implementation by simply not doing what they are told to do or by altering their 
performance procedures. There is also other less concrete ways to exemplify how power is 
exerted which is connected with the social interactions between people, for example using 
titles or academic language. Power might also be sprung out of the personality of a 
physician, for example the physician’s charisma and personal network 
  
 Everywhere, but maybe more profound in middle income countries such as India it is not 
uncommon that the power to influence the implementation in a organization comes from 
local organizational customs. Physicians often do as they always have been doing and 
therefore they possibly exert negative power over the implementation of a new policy that 
maybe challenge the professional latitude or impose a threat to the power that they already 
possess (Erasmus & Gilson, 2008). This is connected with the normative dimension of 
institutional power, which governs the professionals in a workplace and maintains 
institutional norms and belief systems by praising or demonizing players so that they 
follow the institutional standards. It also creates myths about the institution and enhances 
the daily routines and the organizational practices in the workplace. Regional hospitals 
which are offering specialized care often have a more academic profile than local hospitals 
and usually have a higher status. The same is true for the doctors’ status who works in 
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these hospitals. Professionals with higher status often enjoy a higher degree of 
professionalism, which in turn leads to more power within the organization in which the 
professional works (Currie et Al. 2012). 
  
 The highly professional physicians who are working in the hospitals that are authorized to 
give medical cancer treatment under MMPCRKS should therefore enjoy more autonomy 
and a great power to influence the implementation of the current cancer program due to 
their special competence, academic language and social status. Furthermore are the 
empanelled hospitals according to the theory presented ought to be affected by a strong 
professionalism which means that much of the organizational power lies behind the 
hospitals doors. 
  
3.1.4 Disempowered doctors 
Sheikh and Porter (2011) describe the power paradox which occurs in the Indian healthcare 
system in “Disempowered doctors? A relational view of public health policy 
implementation in urban India”. The article highlights the fact that physicians have a 
complicated relationship with those who create public healthcare policy. It is not 
uncommon for physicians to manipulate policy makers to create policies that suits the 
physicians own interests. Through a multilevel perspective, physicians in India are seen as 
a dominant factor in public healthcare system. The physicians exercise power over other 
actors, for example they may affect institutions such as health authorities by their expertise 
and may also directly affect the policy making through lobby making. The intricate power 
paradox however leads the physicians to have a negative power over policy makers in that 
they can hinder implementation of policies at the same time it seems like the physicians 
lack the positive power to change current policies because they lack real influence over 
policymakers. One sign of this power imbalance is the fact that it is commonplace to try to 
control physicians from state level “by coercion or inducements” (Sheikh & Porter, 2011, 
p. 89) to deviate them from taking too much control over their own procedures. This is 
connected with the coercive dimension of institutional power is mainly used by those who 
govern an institution to promote compliance with rules, it is done by facilitating and 
supporting the department, through surveillance, such as supervision and control and 
through deterrence (Currie, 2012). 
 
 There is also a lack of independent medical advice boards, which fails to perform their 
professional regulatory functions. This is partly because these medical advice boards 
overlook misconduct, punitive duties and corruption. The article claims that it is important 
to understand this problem of seeming freedom that gives doctors the ability to flout the 
rules (Sheikh & Porter, 2011, p 84). 
  
 The connection between the equality problems in the Indian public healthcare system and 
how the professionals implement public health should therefore take into account the 
power paradox to be fully comprehended. 
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3.2 Frontline bureaucrats 
 
3.2.1 Lipskys street-level bureaucrats 
The description of the concept “front-line bureaucracy” derives from the work that the 
public agency does, namely dealing with the public on a face to face level; interacting with 
citizens and using discretion over distribution of the public resources. Lipsky’s book 
(1980) street-level bureaucrat, dilemmas of the individual in public services, gives a direct 
insight into the public workers dualistic role in policy implementation and their political 
power as front-line bureaucrats. In the foresight of the theory are the bureaucrats and their 
direct relation to the population in contrast to their obligations within the public sector. The 
presented theory is taken from a bottom-up perspective and points to the bureaucrat as an 
important and final player in the outcome of policies. It’s depending on the relative 
discretion and autonomy of the work itself that the bureaucrat’s room for maneuverability 
is dependent. Thus the power to change policies also varies. 
  
To make use of the theory, the theoretical framework needs to formulate some consensus 
as to the tools used for practical examination. The core concept to be used in the theory is 
discretion and autonomy; as such the tools of examination should be advised on the basis 
of these concepts. 
  
3.2.2 Discretion 
Within Lipsky’s theory, discretion is seen as the amount of freedom a professional have to 
assert a certain situation and act according to his or hers professional judgment. Jointly, 
these judgments will later make up the agency’s behavior on certain matters. Discretion is 
deemed necessary since it’s impossible to severely reduce within certain areas. Lipsky 
mention two such areas, namely; complicated situations and situations that demand human 
dimension responses (Lipsky 1980 p. 13-16). 
  
From the theory, it’s understood that the more specialized a professions, the more 
discretion it usually holds. In turn, this give professional bureaucrat’s considerable power 
in determining who for example gets help, how they in turn get help and to what extent 
they get help from the agencies. Lipsky takes an example from one such profession, 
“Policemen decide whom to arrest and whose behavior to overlook” (IBID., p. 13). As 
such, there is room for the bureaucrat to assert his own judgment, ruling set policies. 
(IBID., p. 13-16) 
  
However, this does not mean that the professions have unlimited resources and power nor 
that they are not controlled in any way. There are still laws, rules and standards for the 
profession to uphold. (IBID). 
  
In the context of discretion, the inevitability of the bureaucrats ruling decisions also creates 
difficulties for the management to control the work, especially in a direct manner.  This 
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creates to the extent of the bureaucrat’s area of expertise, a room to define their own work 
and themselves. Musheno and Maynard-Moody (2003) points to the relationships shaped 
within such an area to be more influential for the work process, than actual rules. This is 
also true in the relation to the individual citizen (Lipsky, 1980). As such, the street-level 
bureaucrats are in a political role due to the element of their work, namely earmarking 
goods and services for the public (IBID). They are, “… not only policy-making actors in a 
policy process, but to a certain extent, they are policy formers rather than implementers.” 
(Hupe & Hill 2007 p. 283).  
  
3.2.3 Relative autonomy from Organizational Authority 
 The street-level bureaucrat strives to greater the amount of autonomy within their position. 
The amount of autonomy is decided by the amount of regulations, standards as well as the 
organizational structure set by the management. Autonomy as such, is here described as the 
organizational latitude for bureaucrats to control their work themselves (Lipsky 1980 p. 16-
18). 
  
The theory also highlights that the level of institutionalization among the professionals 
may influence the claim to certain values and ethical codes within the group. Assumed the 
influence this has on autonomy, it may in turn affect the degree to which the professionals 
use self-binding mechanism. I.e. the front-line bureaucrat’s talent for self-imposed 
regulation. In this case Lipsky points to the bureaucrats as policy-makers in the context of 
defense against discretion, and coping strategies (Hupe & Hill 2007 pp. 282-283), (see 
also Lipsky 1980 p. 149, 151).   
Within an organization there is normally a slippage between set policies and the output of 
policies. This usually has to do with poor communication between managers and workers. 
It can also derive from possible disagreements between the bureaucrats and the current 
policy or organizational goals set by policy-makers. Such disagreements are however to be 
expected and are normally small enough to be neglected and still on track for goal 
attainment. Additionally, pressure or limited resources may force the bureaucrat to make 
certain alterations in policy, simply to cope with the situation at hand (IBID., p. 16-18). 
  
Noncooperation however is seen in some cases were workers does not agree with set 
policies, goals or decisions. In such cases the productivity and performance is crippled, 
thus hurting the organization. Such actions could be both individual, cooperative and can 
for example include, not working, strikes, negative attitudes, forming trade-unions, 
stealing, deliberately wasting resources and working against set policies. Workers can also 
alter the policies, given their level of autonomy and discretion as declared by their 
governance (IBID., p. 16-18). 
  
In relevance to the study, the focus will be taken on the premise and possibility of action 
resulting in diversion of policies and not the factual actions taken. Lipsky declares that 
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(IBID., p. 17), it’s the managers’ core problem to make “workers’ needs for personal, 
material or psychological gratifications mesh with the organization’s needs”. Hence the 
concept regarding autonomy will be seen from the perspective of the relationship between 
managers and workers in regard to the possibility to strive from directives and change 
policy output (IBID., p. 16-23). Similarly the concept of discretion will be seen as the 
amount of freedom offered to the physician in his routines and dealings with the concerned 
patients. 
  
From the theory of front-line bureaucracy, the concepts of relative autonomy and discretion 
are made available for the examination of physicians. Through these we are able to create 
an understanding of the relative amount of freedom offered to the physicians, in their 
contact with patients. This in turn enables further understanding into how much room to 
maneuver the physicians possess; thus affecting their ability to influence or effectively alter 
the programs policies. The theory also captures the dimension of the physicians as a public 
agent, auxiliary framing a base to which the individual interviewee can be made able to be 
generalized as a broader group of professionals. Thus the concepts facilitates examination 
and takes into contrast the physicians possibilities, as front-line bureaucrats to change the 
outcome of policies. 
 
 3.3 The Profession 
The concept of the profession where first covered by Sir Alexander Morris Carr-Saunders 
and Pail Alexander Wilson in their book The profession (1933). Since the book was 
published, the concept has developed and become of increasingly significance in the field 
of public administration. Today research mainly points towards professions from a relation, 
society and conflict-perspective wherein as Saunders and Wilson focused on the 
professional as a positive force on community development. (Brante 1990:75 och 
Einarsdottir 1997:8-10) 
 
3.3.1 Defining profession  
What defines a profession has been classified in diffrent ways, the definition used in this 
study is taken from Alan Bullock and Stephen Trobley (1999) and is defined as "the 
development of formal qualifications based upon education, apprenticeship, and 
examinations, the emergence of regulatory bodies with powers to admit and discipline 
members, and some degree of monopoly rights” (Alan Bullock & Stephen Trombley, The 
New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought,London: Harper-Collins, 1999, p.689.). 
  
  
3.3.2 The medical profession 
There is a special contract between the medical profession and the government. The 
government gives the professionals a monopoly market for their profession and puts high 
value on their knowledge. The medical professionals can by own means control their 
expertise and are protected by the government to maintain control of their special status by 
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special legal protection and certification. The government in turn expects the physicians to 
treat patients based on specific scientifically based expertise. 
Since the late 1970s the physicians’ are gradually in a process of losing their special 
professional status, and there is three main reasons for this; proletarianization (physicians 
becomes wage laborers instead of self employees), deprofessionalization (physicians lose 
their professional attributes, such as autonomous decision-making), and corporatization 
(physicians makes their organization a profit-maximizing corporation) (Timmermans & 
Oh, 2010, pp 95-96). 
  
India has in comparison with other countries such like China been trying to change the 
public health policy implementation and goals by changing the attitudes within the 
bureaucracy, but has failed to make important changes in the attitudes of professionals, 
exempli gratia; the physicians ability to gain equality and effectively in the sector. 
Furthermore are Indian physicians far more autonomous than their counterparts in China, 
and therefore have sustained their specific rights and importance within the public 
healthcare as opposite to the Chinese example where other professional groups such as 
nurses and technicians have taken over some of the physicians work (Maru, 1977). 
 
Out of the three concepts brought up by Timmerman and Oh (2010), the thesis will put 
focus on deprofessionalization. The effect of deprofessionalization on the medical 
profession is of high importance to comprehend the physicians power to influence their 
outcome of our chosen policy. 
 
   
4. RESULT 
Here the analysis, conclusion, and discussion will be presented.  
  
4.1 Analysis of Power 
 
         4.1.1 Disempowered physicians 
When the physician lacks sufficient knowledge about the program and how it works, they 
are also disempowered to implement it. They cannot give advice to the patient of how to 
apply for the free cancer treatment. One physician expresses: 
 
I1A X1: "The patient from Punjab we can recommend medicines for and say that the 
cancer program exist and that if they want, they can apply for it. Now the patient ask us, 
where can we apply for this? This also we don’t know. They will have to find it on their 
own." 
In addition, the same physician says: 
I1A X6: "I learned it from the newspapers…" 
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Another physician seems to have knowledge about the program but lack information about 
where the forms for the program are to be found: 
I8A X6: “No, I Just fill the forms. Somebody else has them.” 
The physicians are also disempowered when the bureaucracy or the system which they are 
dependent upon fails to be efficient or fast enough so that their ability to implement is 
halted or slowed down. This is commonly expressed by the interviewed physicians: 
I1A X5: "And then it is up to you and the government how quickly they give the money. 
So, this is the problem, we don’t know when it comes, how quickly it comes, how much 
comes. …There is not much time to wait, most cases are discovered late." 
I1A X7: "… patients needs to get the medicine by this date. There seems to be late, they 
need to deliver better welfare and speed up the process…" 
I6A X13: “You know - when you’re dealing with the government it always take some 
time...” 
I7A X2: “But getting the money is the problem, because knowing when the money is 
coming is something like a mental service…” 
Being disempowered by the government’s financial delays, one physician describes the 
how the situation looks when comparing getting the funds from MMPCRKS and private 
insurance companies: 
I7A X4: “In India, when the government does the set up… Sorry to say, but they are a bit 
lethargic so getting money from them can take some time. You have to understand the 
financial implications of this scheme, if we don’t get the money we won’t be able to treat 
the patient. By comparison, if we deal with a insurance company, they will do the medical 
auditing and put money on our account and the patient does not need to run anywhere to 
get the treatment, that’s the mayor difference.” 
Even if the physicians are the ultimate implementers of the cancer program, they can stand 
disempowered and not be able to enforce the policy since MMPCRKS’s design causes 
malfunction on another level. One physician discloses that: 
I1A X8: "But remember, we have signed this form many times, but I can’t remember 
anyone coming back to me, saying: “look sir, the money has come”. They usually come 
back and we give them whatever they can afford. But I never seen someone come back 
saying they got the money." 
Two of the empanelled hospitals seem to lack resources to fully be able to implement the 
policy in some cases. This also makes the implementing physicians disempowered. One 
physician tells: 
I7A X8: “But for the patients who come here, most of the are terminal who come here , 
and the problem is that we don’t have a hospital for terminal ill patients. Like a hospice 
27 
 
thing with palliative care.  So they occupy resting beds, they occupy essential services 
where we actually could treat a patient who can survive.” 
I7A X17: “Since we are a charitable institution so we participate for this reason. We only 
get 5-6 % cut on the medicine prices, and there is a lot of job storing and administrating the 
medicines.” 
Another physicians say: 
I2A X4: "This is good for society. But we need manpower and have asked for this, but this 
is lacking. We need manpower to maintain the people that are coming to us." 
One physician feels that MMPCRKS doesn’t give a fair funding in relation to what 
treatment the patient in reality might need and therefore expresses that he is 
disempowered: 
I8A X8: “Companies will produce new things so and all the time we are thinking that it 
maybe is not a thing that is leading to a cure, I would not be very happy to write out these 
kinds of medicines in a palliative setting but if it is curative I would, and I think there is 
room for improvement here. We should have more access to money for the curable 
patients.” 
4.2 Positive Power 
Positive Power, or induction of activities, which leads to alteration or improvement of 
MMPCRKS is shown by many of the physicians. The room for the physicians to exert 
induction seems too often have been given by the hospital in which the physician works. 
Furthermore the impression is that the incentive for the positive power seems to derive 
from the will to reach both official and personal goal attainment. This is demonstrated by 
some physicians as: 
I1A X14: "No, some extra administrative job. But we don’t mind, it’s for the good of the 
patients." 
I4A X4: "They don’t need to do anything, all is the hospitals headache. We take care of 
everything. This is how it works because they don’t have to pay anything they don’t have 
to wait." 
I4A X9: "But then like this one is only for cancer patients. So I for one, is hired simply for 
this purpose. So I’m taking care of everyone who is coming and I’m guiding them and 
filling their form." 
I7A X11: “When he comes to us, he doesn’t need to go home because our civil surgeon 
takes care of it, he do all the job, he gets the file sanctioned, he send it and we get the 
approval from the government.” 
I8A X2: “First we have to confirm the diagnosis and then it has to be confirmed here 
again, as a part of standard care… Rather than to wait for confirmation from an outside 
hospital, to make it more uniform. I cant say that we are the bosses, but to make it more 
uniform it is being done fast so that the cancer is definite and it is not just radiological…” 
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One physician has made innovations, as a great example of positive power, in order to 
better utilize the program and make it more efficient: 
I4A X11: "Earlier it was just a copy, but now to be sure we are keeping the original and 
giving the copy back to the patient. Because they need it for record but we can claim it and 
they have to pay us the money. This is what I initiated. This is done, and then we start the 
procedure." 
I4A X14: "Then I keep these reports if he dies, that he was certainly dying in the reports 
also, this is also my initiative." 
One interviewee mentions that he other physicians are disempowered due to coercive 
regulations, still the physician states that they give advice to the regulators of the 
MMPCRKS. The advice is another example of exerted positive power:   
I7A X12: “… the problem with this scheme is that we after 50 % of the 150 000 rupees 
which is the sanctioned amount from the government is used we send the bill there. But we 
think it is quite unjust. There is actually 50 % of the patients which are at the follow up 
state, and we have advised the government to narrow down this 50 % to 30 %, so when 
these 30 % are exhausted we can send the bill.” 
4.3 Negative Power 
No physician expressed that they resist or want to resist the cancer program. The exertion 
of negative power is therefore not found amongst the interviewees answers. 
 
4.4 Presence of a Normative Dimension 
There is evidence for the existence of normative dimension of institutional power; that 
things are being done as they always has been in the organization. This is not the same 
thing as resistance, but instead it means that the physician is more or less unwilling to 
change the work practice that might lead to exertion of negative power, however in this 
case the normative dimension seems to only affect the attitude to not exert positive power. 
The physician declares: 
I1A X13: "…here no one can tell us how things is run here. Our job at the department is to 
treat the patient in a specific field; if the money comes we treat them." 
4.5 Presence of a coercive dimension 
The coercive dimension of institutional power; that the physicians are controlled in the 
process of implementation of the MMPCRKS might inhibit induction of activities that alter 
or improve the program. One physician say: 
I7A X9: “Basically they discuss all the SOP’s, standard operation procedures, which have 
to be followed. Then the implementation comes and any patient can come for screening 
here and we will do our responsibility, we will cure them and we cooperate with other 
hospitals which are also part of the program and provide awareness and treatment.” 
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Governmental coercive measures empower physicians to defend their own discretion as 
well as it might lead to a smaller latitude for them to exert positive power. The general 
impression of the interviewee’s answers is that they would like to have more guidelines 
and regulations so they know how to implement the program more equally and effectively 
to all who can take benefit from it. Two examples of this: 
I4A X8:  "I feel it is ok, but I feel that right now, there should be certain guidelines and 
such." 
I7A X10: “Yes, it has been improved since the guidelines came from 2014.” 
 
  4.6 Frontline bureaucracy 
 
  4.6.1 Discretion 
 The perceived discretion amongst the treating physicians shows the individual 
departments as largely self-regulating. This argument is strengthened by several 
administrative physicians whom seem to conclude that, business concerning patient 
treatment is left to the departments and treating physicians. A clinician explains: 
 
I1B X1: ”The departments will be independent, here no one can tell us how things are run 
here”, 
 
An administrative physician expresses: 
 
I2B X6: “Whatever the treating doctor say, we use, we have good deals with companies 
and medicines are comparative here, so it’s cheap” 
 
The physicians, on all levels, also seems to be lacking guidelines from the scheme in 
regarding the implementation. Therefore the individual department and thus the treating 
physician are left with the unabridged responsibility of informing and guiding the 
individual patient. This in turn creates a situation where the physicians’ discretion is 
elevated.  One physician concludes: 
 
I4B X8: “No, how should I work, there are no guidelines. Their policy is only this (points 
the earlier mentioned criteria’s of the scheme).  Now however if I see a patient with cancer 
who does not have any insurance, of course I will feel for them, I will sympathies. You 
know. I put myself in their shoes, it all I’m doing, my work” 
 
I4B X4: ”I feel its ok but I feel that right now, there should be certain guidelines and such” 
 
The room for decision-making within the alleged discretion seems to fluctuate dependent 
on the amount of resources, information and time available to the physician. Where such 
resources are threatened the room to maneuver also diminishes. This becomes apparent 
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when questions about how the patients are informed about the scheme and thereafter 
guided through the bureaucratic steps of filling forms are answered, and so on. This ipso 
facto, also reflects that availability of such resources differ in-between hospitals. The 
hospitals with greater resources available seem to have the ability to deliver better 
information and administrative help to the patients whom are applying for the scheme. 
Physicians on these hospitals therefore have greater discretion ability.    
 
I4B X11: “Earlier the girl whom you met was taking care of all this, but then she was all 
alone and it was too much for her. Then they hired me you know, I have been here 2 
months only - but pretty much everything, I change it. So I cleaned up the administrative 
part and told everyone this is how it should be done in this system” 
 
I1B X9 “The patient from Punjab we can recommend medicines for and say that the cancer 
program exist and that if they want, they can apply for it. Now the patient ask us, where 
can we apply for this? This also we don’t know. They will have to find it on their own” 
 
Potential dangers with limited resources and a high amount of discretion could be in the 
context of defense against discretion as well as coping strategies. This is asserted by one 
physicians as; 
 
I4B X3: ”However there are times that you do not see, you know, me being an employee 
and taking the initiative of guiding them” 
 
  4.6.2 Autonomy  
The amount of autonomy given to the individual departments from the management may 
vary between the hospitals, but the general impression is that it’s largely tied to financial 
boundaries. Thus focus on control is in the numbers and not in the procedures. This also 
shows in the administrative knowledge in administrative and economical questions, 
coinciding to the practicing physician’s general lack of managerial guidelines. 
 
I1B X3: ”I learned it from the newspapers… No one has given us information!” 
  
So you came up with your own solutions to the administrative problems? 
I4B X12 - "Yes, yes" 
 
  4.6.3 Professionalism 
From the interviews conducted three where with physicians working as clinicians and six 
where with physicians working administratively. From analyzing the answers there is a clear 
connection to that administrative physicians, in general, are much better versed in their 
knowledge about the scheme than the clinicians. On the other hand, clinicians seem to be 
more aware about the problems of implementation.  An administrative physician discloses 
that: 
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I4C X5:  "The patient generally don’t know what to do. So we fill everything, the form. We 
give the estimate from the physician, we tell them to get this document, we make their file, 
right. I make their file and then once its completed. I tell them that, “now you must go to 
your home town, then meet this physician there”. “then hand it over to them and do not leave 
unless you get the acknowledgement slip”. Otherwise he go there and the physician there he 
is not interested in this extra work and he leave the file on the table only. So the file is lying 
there, he sitting at home and I sit here waiting for the patient. Therefore I tell them not to 
leave before they get the acknowledgment slip..." 
 
Whereas clinicians express: 
 
I1C X2 - "The patient from Punjab we can recommend medicines for and say that the cancer 
program exist and that if they want, they can apply for it. Now the patient ask us, where can 
we apply for this? This also we don’t know. They will have to find it on their own."  
 
I8C X6:  “No, I Just fill the forms. Somebody else has them.” 
 
Profession might also be seen without clear outer boundaries, this means that there might not 
be a profession which represents a “perfect” physician. The respondents represents 
pulmonologists, oncologists, onco-surgeons and radiologists and might therefore feel that 
they belong to these sub specialties rather than the generic name of physician. A 
pulmonologist expresses this as: 
 
I1C X1: "We only deal with lung cancer, only one part… The oncology people are different 
(from me)"  
 
4.7 General opinion on the scheme 
In general the scheme seems to be accepted by the physicians as a good initiativ from the 
state. Some of the administrative physicians for example say:   
 
I2Z X2: “So it’s a very good scheme, in India, in contrast to your country this is rare”  
 
I6Z X1: “This Mukh Mantri, the head of the Punjab government taking on this program, 
you know it’s a very good program started by the government.”  
 
A clinician states: 
  
I8Z X1: “I believe it is a very good program. We have our own difficulties but still it is 
very good”. 
 
The effects of the scheme also seem to be generally appreciated. 
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I2Z X1: “Program is very good, people are being helped”  
 
I5Z X1: “It’s a good scheme, its helping people. Many of them are getting money...”  
 
The only reason of doubt among the interviewees was concerning the implementation and 
local troubles that might occur.  
 
I7Z X3: “It is a very good and noble effort of the government. But the problem is the 
cashless system which has to be implemented in a good way. A lot of insurance companies 
are operating by the best of standards but in government sector of Punjab, they don’t 
understand money, they think everything is for free and they are quite ineffective. They are 
not able to function…”  
 
I2Z X3: “But we need manpower and have asked for this, but this is lacking. We need 
manpower to maintain the people that are coming to us... We have an account of 
everywhere, and we follow the procedure.” 
 
 I8Z X2: “If a large percentage of the patients can be cured then I believe we should have 
more money from the scheme, there is room for improvement. And if they want to be more 
conservative on spending money maybe they should spend a little more on preventive 
things.” 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
The general picture created by the physicians seems to derive at a consensus in their initial 
feelings towards the scheme. Most of them see it as a good initiative by government and as 
something that helps a lot of people. Thereafter their feelings are mixed. Some, especially 
the clinicians, seem to have misgivings with the practical implementation and reach of the 
program. Administrative physicians on the other hand saw more economical or 
administrative-related problems and stayed generally more supportive towards a positive 
opinion on the implementation. 
 
Through the theory of front-line bureaucracy we can discern two features in the physician’s 
environment. They have a large amount of discretion when dealing with patient and their 
autonomy is dependent, not by regulation but rather upon resources. This gives the 
physicians a split view on their surroundings, they can freely treat their patients under the 
scheme, but only if they do so within their indorsed resources. This can, since the resources 
are inconsistent between different hospitals, influence the physicians to derail from one 
another in form of implementing the state policy. Especially since there does not seems to 
be enough follow-up measures from the state-level.  
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In conclusion, the physicians can be said to exercise positive power in order to change the 
outcome of the policy today, but still most of them feel disempowered; trying to fully 
implement the programs scope. 
 
The power which affects the physicians influence over the outcome of MMPCRKS is not 
uniform, because all the physicians seem to carry their very own amount of organizational 
power. Our analysis is that the physicians are indeed a disempowered profession. They are 
trying to implement the MMPCRKS but they can’t get empowered while lacking sufficient 
information and recourses. The same is true for the cancer program which is ought to 
disempowering them due to a complicated bureaucratic system which hampers their effort 
to implement the scheme. In the answers presented there are no clues for physicians 
exerting negative power however there is much suggesting that they exercise positive 
power in order to change the outcome of the policy. The positive power primarily exerted 
by the physicians doesn’t seem to be inductive regarding initiating influence upwards, 
toward politicians or regulating authority. The positive power is instead aimed toward the 
own practice through taking on own administrative initiatives to better coop with goal 
attainment.  
 
The professional latitude, which gives space for more positive power, is relatively big 
among the interviewed physicians. This might be due to a lack of rules and regulation 
given to them. The coercive dimension of institutional power, the governments way of 
managing the physicians, seem to be unsatisfactory and some of the physicians even feel 
disempowered lacking guidelines advising them how to better implement the program. 
 
4.9 Discussion  
The general research area was chosen in accordance to, and not limited to the field of 
public administration. The study hence, also explore the neighboring area of public health, 
something which is natural in an interdisciplinary subject. 
 
The problem in selecting which physicians to investigate might have generated a bias, 
because there is an overrepresentation in the amount of administratively working 
physicians among our respondents. During the initial planning for the research, we also had 
contact with an external source, a professor, from one of the local universities in Punjab. 
She helped us in finding the centrally placed sources, i.e. physicians, potentially also 
creating a bias. There is however no known link between her or the university and the 
examined scheme or interviewees to sustain such criticism.  
 
Cultural differences and language difficulties where sometimes present during the course 
of the interviews. It’s not however likely to have severely impacted our understanding of 
the empirical data collected, and in any such case, unclear statements have not been used in 
the analysis or conclusion.   
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The mapping of empirical data found, id est, the citations, was made under consequent 
theoretical concepts. This mapping was conducted in a separate annex, to be easier 
accessible for the reader and thereby further facilitating the face validity of the study. The 
analysis later was built on the summaries and conclusion made in context with the theories. 
This was also coded to become more readable.    
 
Our understanding is that we have collected valuable information from the physicians 
examined. Regarding the scheme; there is room for improvement. Today, there is a 
potentially inherent and structural default within the policy; coherent to the general lack of 
guidelines. The responsible department could therefore provide more specific guidelines 
and create a new system where the application process for the funds is simplified. By 
making these efforts, it is possible that the physicians would feel more empowered to treat 
all the patients eligible according to the programs scope. Although we haven’t find any 
clear case of physicians exerting negative power to change the outcome of the program, 
further studies in the field of frontline bureaucracy and power could also benefit from  
examine the physicians’ attitudes in a broader sense. 
 
Nevertheless the correlation between a general positive attitude and the absence of 
articulated negative power is clear. Complementary analysis of policy documents would 
probably also be beneficial for future research in similar cases. 
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ATTACHMENTS 
Attachment 1 – Figure 1 
 
Fig 1 
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Attachment  - Coded chosen quotes  
 
Power  
 
Disempowered 
Through lack of information: 
I1A X1 - "The patient from Punjab we can recommend medicines for and say that the cancer 
program exist and that if they want, they can apply for it. Now the patient ask us, where can 
we apply for this? This also we don’t know. They will have to find it on their own."  
I1A X2 - "…maybe 40-50 % come back with the form and then they don’t know how long it’s 
going to take before they can get the money. They don’t know how much they are going to 
get. And again we never know if a particular person got the money or not. From my 
understanding, most of them do not get the money."  
I1A X5 - "And then it is up to you and the government how quickly they give the money. So, 
this is the problem, we don’t know when it comes, how quickly it comes, how much comes. 
…There is not much time to wait, most cases are discovered late." 
I1A X6 - "I learned it from the newspapers…" 
I1A X10 - "Yes, yes, this is all handled by me only..." 
I1A X11 - "…But unfortunately, this country you know, there is a lot of promises from the 
state... this kind of things I often very populistic." 
I7A X14 – “There should also be a sign outside every district hospital of how to get the cancer 
fund. Now there is information at the libraries, but not many people go to the libraries. There 
should be a sign like this.” 
I8A X6 - “No, I just fill the forms. Somebody else has them.” 
 
Through bureaucratic impact on the actual treatment: 
I1A X5 - "And then it is up to you and the government how quickly they give the money. So, 
this is the problem, we don’t know when it comes, how quickly it comes, how much comes. 
…There is not much time to wait, most cases are discovered late." 
I1A X7 - "… patients’ needs to get the medicine by this date. There seems to be late, they 
need to deliver better welfare and speed up the process…" 
I2A X3 - "We send them the bills, telling how much money has been spent on drugs from the 
fund. The government then sanction money. It’s financially audited. So moneywise we have to 
declare to them what has happened. Sometimes they do take time to send us the money." 
I6A X13 – “You know - when you’re dealing with the government it always take some 
time...” 
I7A X1 – “Most countries in Europe have a cashless system regarding the healthcare. Here we 
also have cashless schemes, but these are undertaken by the insurance companies. But it is 
another thing with the government…” 
I7A X2 – “The insurance company will give us a sanction for “X amount” and then we have to 
treat the patient for “x-amount”. But getting the money is the problem, because knowing when 
the money is coming is something like a mental service…” 
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I7A X4 – “In India, when the government does the set up… Sorry to say, but they are a bit 
lethargic so getting money from them can take some time. You have to understand the 
financial implications of this scheme, if we don’t get the money we won’t be able to treat the 
patient. By comparison, if we deal with a insurance company, they will do the medical 
auditing and put money on our account and the patient does not need to run anywhere to get 
the treatment, that’s the mayor difference.” 
 
Through Bureaucratic impact on policy: 
I1A X8 - "But remember we have signed this form many times, but I cant remember anyone 
coming back to me, saying: “look sir, the money has come”. They usually come back and we 
give them whatever they can afford. But I never seen someone come back saying they got the 
money." 
I1A X12 - "We give the government all the information they ask, files and such. You know it 
takes a lot of my time as well, and then we don’t see any of them come back." 
I7A X12 – “… the problem with this scheme is that we after 50 % of the 150 000 rupees 
which is the sanctioned amount from the government is used we send the bill there. But we 
think it is quite unjust. There is actually 50 % of the patients which are at the follow up state, 
and we have advised the government to narrow down this 50 % to 30 %, so when these 30 % 
are exhausted we can send the bill.” 
 
Through lack of guidelines which make the physicians fail in defending their own discretion: 
I4A X8 - "I feel it is ok, but I feel that right now, there should be certain guidelines and such." 
I4A X13 - "No, how should I work, there are no guidelines." 
 
Through lack of resources to make full use of the policy: 
I7A X8 – “But for the patients who come here, most of the are terminal who come here , and 
the problem is that we don’t have a hospital for terminal ill patients. Like a hospice thing with 
palliative care.  So they occupy resting beds, they occupy essential services where we actually 
could treat a patient who can survive.” 
I7A X16 – “As far as we get income from the scheme… it is a loss making for us, the 
hospital.” 
I7A X17 – “Since we are a charitable institution so we participate for this reason. We only get 
5-6 % cut on the medicine prices, and there is a lot of job storing and administrating the 
medicines.” 
I7A X18 – “… government sector of Punjab, they don’t understand money, they think 
everything is for free and they are quite ineffective. They are not able to function…” 
I8A X4 - “The standardized procedures provides a more uniform care.  But there is a problem 
that there is a set amount of medicines that can be used under this scheme. Sometimes the 
patient needs another treatment and then he has to pay himself.” 
I8A X8 - “Companies will produce new things so and all the time we are thinking that it 
maybe is not a thing that is leading to a cure, I would not be very happy to write out these 
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kinds of medicines in a palliative setting but if it is curative I would, and I think there is room 
for improvement here. We should have more access to money for the curable patients.” 
I8A X10 -”Yes.” 
 
Normative dimension 
Through doing as usual: 
I1A X3 – “The welfare department knows how many percent whom apply but It’s not my job 
to have contact with the welfare department.” 
I1A X13 - "…here no one can tell us how things is run here. Our job at the department is to 
treat the patient in a specific field, if the money comes we treat them." 
 
Coercive dimension 
Lack of coercive dimension: 
I1A X9 - "But in regards to guidelines? No no such things." 
I4A X8 - "I feel it is ok, but I feel that right now, there should be certain guidelines and such." 
I4A X13 - "No, how should I work, there are no guidelines." 
 
Through regulations regarding the cancer care:  
I7A X9 – “Basically they discuss all the SOP’s, standard operation procedures, which have to 
be followed. Then the implementation comes and any patient can come for screening here and 
we will do our responsibility, we will cure them and we cooperate with other hospitals which 
are also part of the program and provide awareness and treatment.” 
I7A X10 – “Yes, it has been improved since the guidelines came from 2014.” 
 
Resistance – Negative Power     
Through not complying with the new policy: 
I1A X3 – “The welfare department knows how many percent whom apply but it’s not my job 
to have contact with the welfare department.” 
 
Induction – Positive Power 
Through initiation of an activity which is not included in the policy: 
I1A X4 - "It’s not my job to give out the information about the program but I do it anyway, 
but in the end it’s up to the patient if they want to apply or not." 
I1A X14 - "No, some extra administrative job. But we don’t mind, it’s for the good of the 
patients." 
I2A X2 - "That depends on the cycle they are given, it all depends." 
I4A X2 - "Yes, yes. Generally what happens is that the patient comes here, right. We have that 
form there and we have it in Punjabi and Hindi also." 
I4A X3 - "There are three but the cabin is very small and we have somewhere between 40-50 
people coming in every day. So we try to inform them all, for example I am hired for this 
purpose. So if they need this fund, then we counsel them first. We take the undertaking, that 
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you don’t have any insurance, that you are a resident of Punjab, that no one in your family 
works or has any reimbursement from the government." 
I4A X4 - "They don’t need to do anything, all is the hospitals headache. We take care of 
everything. This is how it works because they don’t have to pay anything they don’t have to 
wait." 
I4A X5 - "The patient generally don’t know what to do. So we fill everything, the form. We 
give the estimate from the doctor, we tell them to get this document, and we make their file, 
right. I make their file and then once its completed. I tell them that, “now you must go to your 
home town, then meet this doctor there”. “Then hand it over to them and do not leave unless 
you get the acknowledgement slip”. Otherwise he go there and the doctor there he is not 
interested in this extra work and he leave the file on the table only. So the file is lying there, he 
sitting at home and I sit here waiting for the patient. Therefore I tell them not to leave before 
they get the acknowledgment slip..." 
I4A X6 - "Yes it’s the same; they are getting the discounted rates that are already in this 
system. So all I have to do is to select to the Mukh Mantri scheme and the rates comes with 
that also." 
I4A X9 - "But then like this one is only for cancer patients. So I for one, is hired simply for 
this purpose. So I’m taking care of everyone who is coming and I’m guiding them and filling 
their form." 
I4A X10 - "At the end of the day, I need to explain it to my supervisors you know, I can show 
them when they ask, “What are you doing for your job”.  So that’s why I made it as simple as 
possible, everyone can understand it." 
I4A X11 - "Earlier it was just a copy, but now to be sure we are keeping the original and 
giving the copy back to the patient. Because they need it for record but we can claim it and 
they have to pay us the money. This is what I initiated. This is done, and then we start the 
procedure." 
I4A X12 - "Yes, yes" 
I4A X14- "Then I keep these reports if he dies, that he was certainly dying in the reports also, 
this is also my initiative." 
I4A X16 - "...Earlier the girl whom you met was taking care of all this, but then she was all 
alone and it was too much for her. Then they hired me you know, I have been here 2 months 
only but pretty much everything I change it. So I cleaned up the administrative part and told 
everyone this is how it should be done in this system." 
I4A X17 - "I’ll have to do it easy so that I don’t work myself to death. But it’s a one part job, 
if I don’t do my job, no one else will take the fall for it. If I don’t come to work one day, then 
it’s not working. Then they simply say, “He’ll be here tomorrow and he’ll tell you all about 
it”." 
I7A X6 – “We are a big hospital and we promote cancer checkups, we have checkup 
brochures and we advise people to go for health checkups.” 
I7A X11 – “When he comes to us, he doesn’t need to go home because our civil surgeon takes 
care of it, he do all the job, he gets the file sanctioned, he send it and we get the approval from 
the government.” 
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Through actively trying to impact the policy makers: 
I2A X4 - "This is good for society. But we need manpower and have asked for this, but this is 
lacking. We need manpower to maintain the people that are coming to us." 
I4A X7 - "Most of the time we get persons who come and get the form filled by us and there 
are chances that these persons don’t come back. They are just not interested. There are several 
reasons. Medicine gives certain consequences… Otherwise regarding the fund, it gets 
approved every time the file goes from here. And we don’t leave anything on the patient’s 
shoulders, we get it done every time.  We see to it, we give it to them, they do not open it, just 
simply hand it over, so that nothing can be misplaced." 
I7A X12 – “… the problem with this scheme is that we after 50 % of the 150 000 rupees 
which is the sanctioned amount from the government is used we send the bill there. But we 
think it is quite unjust. There is actually 50 % of the patients which are at the follow up state, 
and we have advised the government to narrow down this 50 % to 30 %, so when these 30 % 
are exhausted we can send the bill.” 
I8A X2 - “First we have to confirm the diagnosis and then it has to be confirmed here again, as 
a part of standard care… Rather than to wait for confirmation from an outside hospital, to 
make it more uniform. I can’t say that we are the bosses, but to make it more uniform it is 
being done fast so that the cancer is definite and it is not just radiological…” 
 
Front-line Bureaucracy  
 
Discretion 
Practical physicians: 
I1B X1: "…the departments will be independent, here no one can tell us how things are run 
here" 
I1B X2: "…Our job at the department is to treat the patient in a specific field, if the money 
comes we treat them" 
I1B X6: "…No, some extra administrative job. But we don’t mind, it’s for the good of the 
patients" 
I4B X1: "…Yes, yes. Generally what happens is that the patient comes here, right. We have 
that form there and we have it in Punjabi and Hindi also" 
I4B X2: "…I tell them that, “now you must go to your home town, then meet this doctor 
there”. “Then hand it over to them and do not leave unless you get the acknowledgement 
slip”" 
I4B X3: "…However there are times that you do not see, you know, me being an employee 
and taking the initiative of guiding them" 
I4B X4: "…I feel its ok but I feel that right now, there should be certain guidelines and such" 
Have the Mukh Mantri Scheme had an effect on your work, your everyday work? 
I6B X1: No, no. We just deal with the patient, and we meet the patient. We are here when the 
patient is coming and our hospital is empanelled by the Punjab government. 
I8B X1: No, I just fill the forms. Somebody else has them., 
44 
 
I6B X2: But there is a problem that there is a set amount of medicines that can be used under 
this scheme. Sometimes the patient needs another treatment and then he has to pay himself. 
I6B X3: Would you say that you feel bounded by the financial ceiling (1.5 lakh)? 
Yes. 
I1B X9 The patient from Punjab we can recommend medicines for and say that the cancer 
program exist and that if they want, they can apply for it. Now the patient ask us, where can 
we apply for this? This also we don’t know. They will have to find it on their own. 
So you came up with your own solutions to the administrative problems? 
I4B X12 - "Yes, yes" 
 
Administrative physicians: 
I2B X1: "…We have doctors that subscribe drugs and an administration that take care of the 
rest…" 
I2B X6: "…Whatever the treating doctor say, we use, we have good deals with companies and 
medicines are comparative here, so it’s cheap" 
I4B X8: "…No, how should I work, there are no guidelines. Their policy is only this (points 
the earlier mentioned criteria’s of the scheme).  Now however if I see a patient with cancer 
who does not have any insurance, of course I will feel for them, I will sympathies. You know. 
I put myself in their shoes, it all I’m doing, my work" 
I4B X10: "…Like I’m not being judgmental here, but it depends on person to person. Like, 
you see how many patients are already waiting. And we have a huge appointment lists" 
X1B I5: "…It’s actually very simple, the patient gets a form and we fill in an estimate.  Then 
they have to show ID and that they live in Punjab" 
X2B I5: "…There is information available on the internet, both on English and Punjabi" 
I7B X2: When he comes to us, he doesn’t need to go home because our civil surgeon takes 
care of it, he do all the job, he gets the file sanctioned, he send it and we get the approval from 
the government. 
  
Autonomy 
Practical physicians: 
I1B X3: "…I learned it from the newspapers… No one has given us information" 
I1B X4: "…But in regards to guidelines? No, no such things" 
So what you are saying is that no one told you to inform the patient 
I1B X5: "…Yes, yes, this is all handled by me only" 
I1B X7: "…We give the government all the information they ask, files and such. You know it 
takes a lot of my time as well, and then we don’t see any of them come back." 
I1B X8: "…I don’t know why they send you to me... We only deal with lung cancer, only one 
part" 
I4B X6: "...At the end of the day, I need to explain it to my supervisors you know, I can show 
them when they ask, “What are you doing for your job?”.  So that’s why I made it as simple as 
possible, everyone can understand it" 
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I4B X7: "…This is what I initiated. This is done, and then we start the procedure (after 
explaining the procedures at the hospital)" 
I4B X9: "…But if they kick me out and they have somebody who does not work with this. 
They simply say, “Ok I see what can be done, I’ll give you a call and then ill inform you”. 
This is how it works in other systems, those who does not want to take the headache of all this 
stuff. It’s not an easy task. Because I do the billing, keep record of the test and the.. When the 
test have been don, I keep the reports also. Then I keep these reports if he dies, that he was 
certainly dying in the reports also, this is also my initiative" 
I4B X11: "...Earlier the girl whom you met was taking care of all this, but then she was all 
alone and it was too much for her. Then they hired me you know, I have been here 2 months 
only but pretty much everything, I change it. So I cleaned up the administrative part and told 
everyone this is how it should be done in this system" 
 
Administrative physicians: 
I2B X5: "…But we need manpower and have asked for this, but this is lacking. We need 
manpower to maintain the people that are coming to us" 
X3B I5: "…It’s actually very simple, the application leave here, then It need to be stamped 
and cleared, then we can start treatment" 
I5B X4 "...But sometimes some people don’t come back and collect the money, that is a 
problem. So basically some patients don’t come back to collect the money. 
Any idea why? 
- No, but you can perhaps go to the specific doctor there and find out. But sometimes they fail 
to collect" 
 
Profession 
 
Administrative physician  
 
I4C X1:  "The patient generally don’t know what to do. So we fill everything, the form. We 
give the estimate from the doctor, we tell them to get this document, we make their file, right. 
I make their file and then once it’s completed. I tell them that, “now you must go to your home 
town, then meet this doctor there”. “Then hand it over to them and do not leave unless you get 
the acknowledgement slip”. Otherwise he go there and the doctor there he is not interested in 
this extra work and he leave the file on the table only. So the file is lying there, he sitting at 
home and I sit here waiting for the patient. Therefore I tell them not to leave before they get 
the acknowledgment slip..." 
 
Clinical physicians 
 
I8C X1:  “No, I just fill the forms. Somebody else has them.” 
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I1C X1: "We only deal with lung cancer, only one part… The oncology people are different 
(from me)"  
 
I1C X2 - "The patient from Punjab we can recommend medicines for and say that the cancer 
program exist and that if they want, they can apply for it. Now the patient ask us, where can 
we apply for this? This also we don’t know. They will have to find it on their own."  
 
Research question one 
 
Administrative 
I2 X1: “Program is very good, people are being helped”  
I2 X2: “So it’s a very good scheme, in India, in contrast to your country this is rare” 
I2 X3: “But we need manpower and have asked for this, but this is lacking. We need 
manpower to maintain the people that are coming to us... We have an account of everywhere, 
and we follow the procedure.” 
I5 X1: “It’s a good scheme, its helping people. Many of them are getting money...” 
I6 X1: “This Mukh Mantri, the head of the Punjab government taking on this program, you 
know it’s a very good program started by the government.”  
I7 X3: “It is a very good and noble effort of the government. But the problem is the cashless 
system which has to be implemented in a good way. A lot of insurance companies are 
operating by the best of standards but in government sector of Punjab, they don’t understand 
money, they think everything is for free and they are quite ineffective. They are not able to 
function…”  
 
Clinical 
I4 X1: “… Otherwise is feel good about the scheme, it’s an incredibly good initiative taken by 
the government and the state.”  
I8 X1: “I believe it is a very good program. We have our own difficulties but still it is very 
good”. 
I8 X2: “If a large percentage of the patients can be cured then I believe we should have more 
money from the scheme, there is room for improvement. And if they want to be more 
conservative on spending money maybe they should spend a little more on preventive things.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
